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RENTING FARM MACHINERY AT
RETIREMENT OR OTHERWISE
— by Neil E. Harl*
The 1989 Tax Court case of Carl Stevenson1 has raised
questions as to whether self-employment tax is due on
rental income where farm machinery is rented to others
(usually children) after retirement or is retained at the time
of incorporation and rented to the newly-formed corporate
entity.
Stevenson  case.  The case of Carl Stevenson2
involved a taxpayer operating as a sole proprietorship who
leased portable advertising signs to others.  The taxpayer
argued that the rentals were not subject to self-employment
tax and relied upon I.R.C. Section 1402 excluding rentals
from self-employment tax.  The Tax Court held for IRS and
agreed that the rentals were subject to self-employment tax.
The facts in Stevenson are important.  In that case, the
taxpayer purchased the portable advertising signs for rental
or resale, received all telephone orders for the rental and sale
of signs, advertised the availability of the portable signs,
maintained a bank account for the venture and kept a cash
receipts and disbursement journal.  The taxpayer personally
assembled all new portable signs and stored the signs at a
rented warehouse.  The taxpayer stored used portable signs
at the warehouse.  The taxpayer repaired the used signs and
maintained all signs that were rented or sold.  The taxpayer
personally delivered signs that had been purchased or rented.
The taxpayer formulated and implemented marketing plans
for the sale and rental of the portable signs and obtained all
of the necessary licenses, permits and operating certificates
required by units of government.  The court pointed out that
72 percent of the taxpayer's gross receipts came from the
rental of portable signs.  In short, the taxpayer was carrying
on a trade or business.  The taxpayer was not a mere passive
lessor of property.
Section 1402 .  The taxpayer argued that the rentals
from the portable sign activity were excluded from self-
employment income because of the language of I.R.C.
Section  1402  that  imposes  a  tax  on  "self-employment
income."3 That section states that "self-employment income
*
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means —
"Net earnings from self-employment derived by an
individual...during any taxable year...."
subject to various exclusions.4  Excluded from "net earnings
from self-employment" are "rentals from real estate and
from personal property leased with the real estate...."5  The
exclusion does not provide an exclusion for the rental of
personal property apart from the real estate.  
The Tax Court decision in Stevenson, however, held
that the taxpayer was conducting a trade or business and so
the amounts were involved were subject to self-employment
tax.6
Lessons from Stevenson .  Several lessons can be
derived from the case of Carl Stevenson.
•  Anyone conducting a "trade or business" is subject to
self-employment tax.7
•  Anyone receiving payments under an arrangement that
does not constitute a trade or business should not be subject
to self-employment tax.8  Thus, an individual who retires
and rents farm machinery to another, family member or
otherwise, should not be subject to self-employment tax
unless the lessor is active under the rental arrangement.
This is not because of the exclusion of rents from self-
employment income — that exclusion is only for rentals
from real estate and from personal property leased with the
real estate.9  That outcome is because an individual who
retires and leases the farm machinery to another in a passive
rental arrangement should not be considered engaged in a
trade or business.
•  A taxpayer renting land under a material participation
crop share or livestock share lease is subject to self-
employment tax.10
•  Anyone renting land under a crop share or livestock
share lease under a non-material participation arrangement
should not be subject to self-employment tax.11  Rental for
the land, and from any personal property leased with the
land, is excluded from net earnings from self-employment.12
•  What about an individual leasing personal property to
an entity for which they are active employees?  In theory,
the answer should depend upon whether the lessor is
sufficiently involved under the lease for the leasing activity
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to be considered a trade or business.13  For a lessor who is
the sole employee of the entity as lessee, the task of
resisting an I.R.S. assertion of trade or business status for
the lessor is the most difficult.  Certainly anyone leasing
personal property — or even real property — to a lessee for
which they are rendering services should use care to develop
the strongest possible case for passive investor status rather
than trade or business status.  That means the lease should
be drafted to place responsibility for maintenance and repair
on the lessee, for example, and the lessee should avoid
involvement as lessee in management or decision making
relative to the property under the lease.
FOOTNOTES
1 T.C. Memo. 1989-357.
2 Id.
3 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
4 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
5 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
6 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
10
  Id.  See 4 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 37.03[3] (1991).
1 1 Id.
1 2 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
1 3 I.R.C. § 1402(a).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor claimed as a business
homestead property leased to the debtor's wholly-owned
corporation.  The court held that the debtor was allowed a
business homestead exemption in the property.  In re
John Taylor Co., 935 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1991).
The debtor claimed a rural homestead exemption for two
lots of land in a rural subdivision located outside a city
limits.  The lots were contiguous except that a county road
by easement passed over the line between the lots.  The
court held that the debtor was entitled to a rural homestead
exemption because the subdivision did not have the
characteristics (no local government, businesses or schools)
of a city, town or village.  Both lots were included in the
exemption because the lots were contiguous except for the
road and the debtor treated the properties as one.  In re
Weaver, 128 B.R. 234 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1991).
Although the debtors signed an agreement with the
trustee that the debtors' interests in an ERISA-qualified
retirement plan were estate property and not exempt, the
employer and plan administrator argued that the interests
were exempt under Missouri law.  The court held that the
Missouri exemption for retirement plans was pre-empted by
ERISA.  In re  Carver, 128 B.R. 239 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1990).
The trustee filed an objection to the debtor's claimed
exemption of an interest in a pension plan.  The objection
was denied because the trustee failed to file the proof of
service.  The trustee filed a second objection, with proof of
service, after the date for filing objections.  The bankruptcy
court had allowed the late objection, holding that the
objection related back to the timely first objection.  The
district court held that the second objection did not relate
back and was untimely.  The case did not raise the issue of
whether the exemption would be allowed even without a
proper objection as was discussed in a couple of recent
cases.  (See In re Peterson, 920 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1990)
p. 47 supra and In re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
1991) p. 99 supra)  Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B . R .
254 (D. Neb. 1991).
The debtor had filed a Chapter 13 case in which the plan
was confirmed.  The debtor had claimed as exempt interests
in two IRA's.  The debtor converted the case to Chapter 7
and the trustee objected to the exemptions for the interests
in the IRA's, arguing that a recent state case had declared the
exemptions unconstitutional.  The court held that the debtor
was not entitled to the exemptions because as of the date of
the conversion, the exemptions were not allowed.  In re
Marcus, 128 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
The debtor claimed the Massachusetts $100,000
exemption for a homestead with a fair market value of
$140,000 and $50,000 of equity, with the intent to avoid
liens against the home.  A creditor with a lien against the
home argued that the exemption be applied to the fair
market value of the home before deducting any liens against
the home.  The court held that the exemption applied to the
debtor's equity and that liens could be avoided to the extent
the debtor's exemption would be impaired.  In re
Giarrizzo, 128 B.R. 321 (Bankr. D. Mass .
1991) .
The debtor claimed an exemption, under Ohio law, of a
homestead and sought avoidance of a lien impairing the
exemption.  The lien creditor had obtained relief from the
stay to proceed to foreclosure on the home.  The court held
that the homestead exemption does not arise until
execution, attachment or sale of the residence and that the
lien may not be avoided until one of those actions has been
taken.  However, because an attempt to avoid a lien at the
time of sale would be difficult, the court held that upon the
filing of the praecipe for issuance of the order for the sale,
the debtor may file for lien avoidance.  In re  Cardwell,
128 B.R. 427 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY.  The debtor
owned a residence with the nondebtor spouse as tenants by
the entirety and the trustee sought court approval for the
sale of the debtor's interest to the nondebtor spouse for the
fair market value of the debtor's interest, as an entirety
interest in the property.  The sole creditor objected to the
sale by claiming that the sale would remove estate property
